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This thesis paper is three sections covering three countries (North Korea, South 
Korea, and the People's Republic of China) to study if and how realism explains the 
origins and attitude of each nuclear program. First, it investigates the impact of realism 
and its implications on the North Korean nuclear program. It explores what China's 
involvement with North Korea and interactions with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 
The first chapter examines historical evidence of North Korea's nuclear experimentation 
interaction with the United States, China, and South Korea in order to test if classical 
realism accurately explains the origins of the program. My second chapter researches 
how well neorealism explains the origins of the South Korean nuclear program. Lastly, 
the third chapter will seek to evaluate the effectiveness of the concept of realism in 
explaining the growth of China's nuclear weaponry. The aim is to determine whether 
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Thesis Introduction  
 Each chapter of the overall thesis will dissect how realism (in South Korea's case, 
neorealism) plays a distinct role in their ideology, history, and current operations. My 
hypothesis is realism and neorealism is the best explanation for the creation of North 
Korea's, South Korea's, and China's nuclear programs.  
Specifically, realism and the quest for power explains the current and historical 
nature of the Asia Pacific area. The definition I will use for realism is that theory under 
international relations that believes conflict follows from human nature. Neorealism's 
definition is that conflict is derived from a turbulent state system, not human nature. 
Power is an important desire and concept within this area in the world compared to other 
areas of the world such as Europe and South America. North Korea, South Korea, and 
China leadership define power differently and regard their version of the concept 
superior. Other international relations theories on the study of non- nuclear (and nuclear) 
proliferation include idealism, which means nations pursue nuclear development based 
off of the utility of nuclear programs and its symbolism.1 Idealism takes on the form of 
perception from other countries toward the states seeking nuclear power. Based off the 
premise that states genuinely want to be seen as "good citizens," realism is more aligned 
to the situation in the Asia Pacific, namely because North Korea is not concerned about 
the opinions of other countries. Another theory is neoliberal institutionalism, which states 
that other countries should be concerned with their own institutions and upgrading them 
                                                          




before concerning themselves over other ones in the international community.2 This 
theory more concerns itself with global organizations, rather than countries in my 
opinion. Also, traditional studies have used realism and neorealism to explain historical 
decisions, which is why I wanted to test the realist's theories out. Another theory, 
constructivism, is defined as a theory in international relations theory we understand 
political institutions as social constructs.3 Differences in classical and modern realism are 
briefly evaluated, with more emphasis placed on the thinker's interpretation (e.g, 
Mearsheimer, Waltz, etc.) than the actual definition itself. Testing the neorealism and 
realism theories best describes the nuclear origins of North Korea, South Korea, and 
China.   
The first chapter briefly outlines the story behind American-North Korean nuclear 
relations and how well realism tests their capabilities. The first section tests how classical 
realism explains the origins of the North Korean nuclear program and its interactions 
with the NPT.  Sanctions and traditional policies are examined and briefly evaluated. 
The second chapter tests how well neorealism explains the lack of a nuclear 
program in South Korea. Both Neorealism and realism argue states are always in a 
perpetual quest for security. Realism centers on pessimistic views that argue security is 
needed because of human nature and its flaws. Conversely, neo-realism argues security is 
desired because of the flaws in the unstable international system, not human nature. The 
second paper dives into the differences between the definitions of neorealism and how 
the early thinkers thought of neorealism.  Also, how structural realism is unique 
                                                          
2  David Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1993) 16.  
3 J. Samuel Barkin, Realist Constructivism: Rethinking International Relations Theory, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 13. 
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concerning South Korea's ideology is researched and identified. The second chapter also 
goes over the difference between power and security, and why neorealism thinkers regard 
security as more important than power. The security alliance between the United States 
and South Korea is unique in nature. Additionally, South Korea's nuclear history is 
briefly examined to discover if any related facts are explained with neorealism. 
The third chapter to my thesis emphasizes the origins and complex nature of the 
People's Republic of China (PRC) nuclear program. The third chapter seeks to study the 
effectiveness in China's decision to build a nuclear program against the realism theory. 
The objective of the third paper is to identify if realism sufficiently explains the rise in 
Chinese nuclear power or if other theories need to emphasize growth. In the third chapter, 
classical realism is researched to see if external pressures from other neighboring states 
forced the PRC to upgrade their capabilities. Kenneth Waltz's studies on the subject of 
realism are bounced against Chinese's nuclear decisions and its quest for more power. 
The question of hegemony under the Chinese nuclear structure is also examined, on 
whether or not how much power is too much power. The fundamental difference in the 
research with the third chapter is that it directs more attention to the contrasts of offensive 
and defensive realism, due to China's obsession with hegemony.    
This topic is a significant one to understand. North Korea and China consistently 
test their ballistic missile programs daily under the careful surveillance within the United 
States. North Korea is already upgrading their intercontinental ballistic missiles to target 
key U.S. territories in California, Hawaii, and Alaska. Not only researching the 
equipment capability but testing them against political theory assures the researcher a 
complete understanding of each nation's intentions.   
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China has always possessed a vigorous and consistent nuclear program since the 
early sixties. It would be a severe disadvantage from an American researcher's standpoint 
to be unaware of the progression of the Chinese nuclear program, to include its history. 
Realism and neorealism play a distinct and vital role in understanding why these nations 
possess a nuclear program because the political nature of realism is conflict. Also, the 
North Korean, South Korean and Chinese pursuit of power and security necessitates the 
study of neorealism and realism because of the uncertain nuclear future in the Asia 
Pacific area.   
Each chapter is connecting in style, research type, and presentation. This thesis is 
a study of how realist and neo-realist theories explain country behavior and they're 
nuclear program background. Emphasis is briefly placed on history while more meaning 
is put on its relevance to realism. Each country (North Korea, South Korea, and China) is 
chosen due to its controversial history and unpredictable nature in modern times as its 
relates to the American political agenda. The basis for each country's unpredictable 
nature is the increase in both North Korean nuclear capability and Chinese ballistic 
missile capability, despite disapproval from the international community. The chapters in 
the thesis represent each distinct history, current situation, and anticipated future with 
America. The distinction is placed within the chapters to highlight the ally and rival 
differences.  
America must remain diligent and vigilant against the rapid buildup of the North 
Korean and Chinese nuclear programs. American must also continue to support South 
Korea's ability to counter act both the North Korean and Chinese threats by adding 
capabilities such as terminal high-altitude area defense (THAAD) in other parts in South 
5 
 
Korea. Perhaps the United States leadership can take away key concepts under realism 
(pursuit of power, security as a core value, etc). Also, American leadership must continue 
to study the past, present, and anticipated future of the North Korea and Chinese nuclear 
threats. This scope of the nuclear expansion by both North Korea and China expands well 
beyond a thesis. Additionally, upgrading the South Korean nuclear systems and 
understanding of their neighboring threats is vital to American military mission 
accomplishment. 
 
First Chapter: North Korean Historical Overview 
The United States and the United Nations Security Council monitor North 
Korea’s nuclear proliferation capabilities. Nuclear programs in North Korea date back to 
the 1950’s through its nuclear energy program with aims of strengthening its international 
status and spreading communism to the South. During mid-1960’s, an atomic energy 
research development developed in Yongbyon staffed by specialists modeling the Soviet 
foundation of nuclear science. In the 1970’s, North Korea started concentrating on 
learning about nuclear fuel cycle to include refining, conversion, and fabrication. The 
country embarked on the construction of the second reactor with a 5-megawatt capacity.4 
Officials in the U.S. declassified intelligence reports uncovering nuclear reactor 
development approximately 90km north of Pyongyang near Yongbyon. This led to 
                                                          




increasing international pressure compelling Pyongyang to join the NPT in 1985. 
However, North Korea became part of the NPT on December 12, 1985.5  
With South Korea’s desire to promote exchanges with North Korea to promote 
contact in international forums, family reunification and trade, South Korea’s president 
offered to discuss security issues with North Korea in the United Nations General 
Assembly. Consequently, a bilateral regime came into force to verify Peninsula 
denuclearization with over agreements that the two Korea states shall not manufacture, 
test, receive, produce, store, deploy, possess or use nuclear weapons. Another significant 
occurrence of the 1992 Joint Declaration was that the United States removed its nuclear 
weapons from South Korea in December 1991.6  No agreement could be reached on 
establishing a joint inspection regime. Little progress regarding inspection regime had 
been made bringing dialogues between the international community and Korea to a 
standstill by the fall of 1992.7 The Agreed Framework (started on October 21, 1994) 
mandated that North Korea stop the building of nuclear reactors in possible connection 
with a covert nuclear weapons program "in exchange for two proliferation-resistant 
nuclear power reactors."8 This agreement solidified several joint United States-North 
Korean responsibilities such as not threatening each other with nuclear weapons, full 
                                                          
5 IAEA, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/dprk/fact-sheet-on-dprk-nuclear-safeguards. 
6 "The Nuclear Information Project," accessed August 5, 2017, 
http://www.nukestrat.com/korea/withdrawal.htm. 
7 Park Ki-Tae, Analyzing North Korea's Decision-Making Process on its Nuclear Weapons Program with the 
Rational Choice and Cognitive Choice Models. (Albany: State University of New York, 2010), 20.  




participation from North Korea regarding reactor inspections, and North Korea remain 
part of the NPT. North Korea eventually left the agreement on January 11, 2013.9 
Denuclearization became one of the most crucial and critical issues in the unstable 
Korean Peninsula. North Korea’s violation of the September 19 Joint Statement that had 
been reached by the six parties in 2005 led to an objection by the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) since the country had promised to abandon all nuclear weapons and 
programs that were in existence. As a result, the UNSC adopted various Resolutions to 
impose strict sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to 
date due to its unauthorized development of nuclear weapons that have in turn ignited the 
speculation regarding its future relationship with China.10 
 
First Chapter: China's involvement with North 
Korea  
Despite the perception of many Western powers of China as an “ally” to North 
Korea, China surprisingly supported the UNSCR 2270 against the DPRK.11 
Domestically, the North Korean leadership of the country has achieved more strength and 
shored up backing through the latest nuclear tests it has conducted. The DPRK's 
reputation internationally has severely been tarnished and has since isolated themselves 
from the international community. The continuous vicious circles of nuclear tests by the 
                                                          
9 Ibid.  
10 "Security Council Imposes Fresh Sanctions," United Nations, accessed July 4, 2017, 
https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12267.doc.htm.  
11  Joseph R. DeTrani, "After 20 Years of Failed Talks with North Korea, China Needs to Step Up". Arms 
Control Today, October, 2014.  
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DPRK has unintentionally given the United States reasons to heighten its military 
presence by placing U.S. Navy Aegis destroyers around the Korean Peninsula for 
surveillance operations.  
During the post-cold war transformation, international relations and regional 
tensions in East Asia improved significantly. This backdrop created a natural incentive 
for China to rethink its relations with other North-Eastern states notably South Korea and 
Japan to reconcile Peninsula by ending the actual military hostility. China had to step up 
for the sake of its prosperity and security for its people. In 1992, China and the Republic 
of South Korea successfully formed diplomatic relations, a condition that brought 
discontent with North Koreans.12 This made North Korea start negotiating to end security 
pressure. The United States government increased policies on nuclear programs, 
intensifying tensions in the Korean Peninsula stalling any reconciliation efforts between 
the South and the North.  
The stalemate between the United States and North Korea have left China with 
slim chances of coordinating policies and reconciling the Peninsula although their 
willingness to mediate for peace and stability in the region. Peace and security is limited 
in the Asia Pacific area of the world when North Korea exercises inconsistent adherence 
to rules regarding nuclear inspection and protocol. Initially, China’s support for North 
Korea was premised on the unique relations the two countries had. Currently, its support 
to North Korea can only be conducted under the United Nations Security Council’s 
                                                          
12 Nicholas D. Kristof, "Chinese and South Koreans Formally Establish Relations," NYTimes, August 24, 




resolutions with the outset of the special relations taking a paradigm shift towards an 
ordinary bilateral status with features that would usually define an ‘alliance’ gradually 
wearing out in light of the DPRK’s disregard of the international law. China's shift is due 
to North Korea's disregard for international law.  
        First Chapter: Research Question 
The central question of the first section is if realism explains North Korea’s 
nuclear program. Additionally, to test whether the United States security assurances to 
North Korea’s neighbors and enemies instigate North Korea’s efforts to acquire nuclear 
weapons despite threats, restrictions, and sanctions by the international community 
through strictest resolutions by the United Nation Security Council. Based on this 
scenario the sub-question will be as follows:  will it be possible to halt or address nuclear 
proliferation in North Korea adequately without resorting to fully developed military 
tactics? 
This research question will necessitate proper examination of the types of possible 
policies that could be adopted and utilized by the United States and the United Nations 
Security Council in an attempt to dissuade North Korea (DPRK) to denuclearize and stop 
proliferating nuclear weapons programs. Examination of these policies will delve into the 
successes and failures of prior diplomatic tools that have been designed and employed to 
change a country’s incentives, particularly sanctions and the possible strategies that are 
engagement based rather than imperialistic actions. Through approach by approach 
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comparative analysis, the study will attempt to determine the policies that are best suited 
for the North Korean delicate situation.  
    First Chapter: Hypothesis 
Realism mainly justifies North Korea’s decision and motivation to seek nuclear 
weapons and programs. Policies implemented by the United States have an enormous 
bearing on the position of North Korea on its nuclear weapons program. 
Security assurances by the United States to North Korea’s neighbors and enemies 
is a vital factor influencing North Korea’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons amid the 
threats, restrictions, and sanctions by the international community laws through strictest 
resolutions by the United Nation Security Council. With the strengthened commitment by 
the United States of America to improve its effectiveness and credibility in security 
assurances to its allies in the Northeast Asian states with the aim of deterring the 
development of latent nuclear capability only increases doubt about its motives in the 
region.   
To explain North Korea’s past courses of action pertaining its nuclear decision, 
this study will examine and test how well realism explains the country’s motivation to 
advance its nuclear program. Since the end of the Cold War, the role of United States in 
security and economic assurances have substantially changed with doubts increasing on 




This study will analyze the critical factors (pessimism against the international 
community, quest for power, global isolation) that connect realism to North Korea's 
desire for nuclear sovereignty.  The study will hence investigate the scope and extend to 
which these factors motivate North Korea to pursue proliferation of nuclear weapons by 
overtly testing their arsenal after developing them. Considering the efforts that have been 
put in place, the future of non-proliferation appears increasingly unsteady. 
  First Chapter: Literature Review 
As the Cold War era drew to a halt, front-runners around the world thought the 
era of nuclear threats had automatically come to an end. In reality, it had advanced to a 
new phase. Threats from erratic militarism from rogue states (such as North Korea) 
escalated by bringing fear that these states were seeking nuclear weapons as ‘equalizers’ 
in their confrontations with their powerful enemies.13  
 The September 11th terrorist attack intensified the determination of the policy 
makers of the United States to strategize the arrest and reversal of nuclear weapon 
proliferation-particularly nuclear weapon acquisition by politically unstable and rogue 
states with the potential of transferring their fatal capability to terrorists either as a result 
of lack of adequate controls over their arsenals or deliberately. For the moment, Russia 
and the United States have amicably reached an agreement to lead by example and 
primarily reduce their nuclear stockpiles.  Furthermore, missiles in the two nations are 
                                                          
13 Yoshifumi Ide, Akira Igata, Gibum Kim, Sung Hyo Kim, and Tong Zhao, "Conventional threats from the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)", Journal of International Relations 26, no. 3 (2016): 37.  
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being de-targeted with an initiation of negotiations and proposals to deepen their 
reductions further.  
Although the U.S. is exercised by these developments and unambiguously 
contrasted additional nuclear proliferation, it has largely been part of the problem for the 
rogue nature of North Korea. This is because of its defense posture. Moreover, the United 
States has refused to adopt the policy of no-first-use, a measure that has made the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) validate the beliefs of other states in the political 
power of nuclear weapons program undermining the dissuasion and denuclearization 
process by other nations. 
The future of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons programs increasingly looks 
unstable and a mirage chase. Therefore, creating multifaceted responses to address the 
plethora of issues posing international concerns on nuclear proliferation is assuredly a 
daunting aspect. Although the United States is justified to lead the way in this fight of 
denuclearizing unauthorized states in possession of nuclear weapons and deter any 
likelihood of other new states from fostering efforts to possess nuclear capabilities, the 
country’s diplomacy is complex in the contemporary world possibly due to the context in 
which the country’s policy makers operate. The situation between the United States and 
North Korea has given America unprecedented possibilities for leadership. This situation 
has orchestrated many ordinary states to be resentful of the power that has been 
concentrated in the United States. 
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            Despite the existence of a multitude of laudable studies on the benefits of 
vigorous policies by the U.S to confront proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
around the world both in the U.S and beyond, studies have specifically focused on 
diplomacy issues that effectively address the mushrooming of emerging ‘third tier’ 
nuclear weapon states in the twenty-first century. Little or no recognizable studies have 
uniquely examined the effect of threats and sanctions on rogue states that have been 
sidelined, ‘proclaimed’ as an enemy and targeted by the United States and the United 
Nation Security Council since time like North Korea. 
With the predicament surrounding North Korea, U.S and the rest of the world, 
there seems to be no technical fix that can bring an immediate end to nuclear proliferation 
in the Korean peninsula. It is crystal clear that all the efforts that have been put in place 
have terribly failed to offer a lasting solution. Potential policies to deter nuclear 
proliferation have only proved further complicate the situation. However, there are some 
measures that either singly or combined that can be effective in the years ahead. 
The phenomenon of nuclear weapon proliferation with its associated causes and 
policy choices undertook to combat it are relevant in a myriad of paradigms in the 
international relations scholarly field. As compared to other studies that have arbitrated 
between the contending paradigms, this study delves into the insights of various schools 
of thought to illuminate the primal problem by evaluating the desirability and feasibility 
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of alternative policy responses that could offer a better and desirable solution to nuclear 
proliferation in North Korea.14 
The realist school, both in its Neorealism and classical variants, offers the most 
convincing fundamental explanation to the increasing desire of additional states apart 
from the ‘Big Five’ to attempt to arm themselves with nuclear weapons and other 
weapons of mass destruction. Classical realists perceive power as the most overriding 
consideration in International Relations (IR). It regards military capability as a primal 
ingredient to international power with the possession of nuclear weapons regarded as one 
of the most vital components of military capability with states preferring to own their 
own to maintain security independence. States advance power, particularly against rivals 
by seeking their nuclear weapons in arm for ‘security dilemmas.' The unending security 
tensions when a nation arms herself with nuclear weapons result in security paradox 
based on an anarchic international system since advances by any particular nation to 
increase its security will compromise the strength of another state, hence the reason for 
the unending tensions in the Korean peninsula. In other words, realism confirms that 
there is no current solution on the Korean peninsula.  
However, not all realists are afraid of the outcomes of the security dilemma. As a 
matter of fact, neo realists like Kenneth Waltz viewed nuclear weapons as bringing 
increased stability as backstopped by the concept of Mutually Assured Destruction 
(MAD) in which many IR theorists have since time immemorial believed to be the 
                                                          
14 Tuang, Liang, Explaining North Korean Nuclear Weapons Motivations: Constructivism, Liberalism, and 
Realism, North Korean Review, 2013.  
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principle of reason expounding why nuclear war has never occurred.15  Robert Jervis 
summed the justification up: "Explanation of the superpower caution with nuclear 
weapons: expounding on the increased probability of destruction arising from countries 
seeking excessive gains."16 Many states having plausible expectations of future conflicts 
with nuclear-armed states will instead have the incentive and rational strategic reasons to 
acquire substantial nuclear weapons.  
However, ‘a nuclear pessimist’ by the name Sagan, denounced Waltz’s rationale 
about nuclear nations behaving rationally. First, he questioned Waltz’s assumption of 
small states developing second strike capabilities capable of deterring retaliatory and 
preemptive attacks.17 Regarding this assumption, he questioned whether there would be 
implementation of command and control procedures aimed at guarding inadvertent use of 
nuclear weapons by these states. He also questioned Waltz’s perception on military 
leaders similar to civilian governments refraining from preemptive nuclear strikes but 
instead argued that the future of the new nuclear states might use such weapons due to the 
lack of civilian control.18 
With this regard however, I overtly oppose this kind of reasoning as some nations 
may fail to effectively manage their arsenals allowing them to be accessed by terrorist 
groups that could be misused to target and destroy innocent lives. Additionally, failure to 
                                                          
15 Kenneth Waltz, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better," Adelphi Papers, Number 171 
(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981).  
16 Robert Jervis, The Utility of Nuclear Deterrence. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, eds. International 
Politics. Fourth Edition (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, Inc., 1996), 218.  
17 Kenneth, N. Waltz, Theory of International and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons: Paper No. 171. 
(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981), 76.  
18  Ibid.  
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restrict might endanger the peace and stability in the world. Premised on this theory, 
diplomacy should be well staged unconditionally to those nations in possession of nuclear 
weapons like North Korea without making them feel as if they are the target of every 
other nation.19 Whether or not the international community should accept nuclear 
weapons as a means of security remains to be seen.  
According to Glenn Snyder, both the arguments might be correct premised on his 
‘stability-instability paradox’ that premised on the incredible devastation that can be 
incurred after a nuclear war, neither side might perceive nuclear weapon as an effective 
instrument of war.20 However, under the concept of mutually assured destruction, both 
sides may be more prone to conventional attacks. Therefore, realism is critical in the 
providing explanations for the most basic determinants of nuclear politics.  
          First Chapter Method 
The research strategy and methodology employed in answering the research 
question of this study is grounded in qualitative research and content analysis. Qualitative 
research is premised on understanding, describing and expounding international relation 
phenomena by evaluating the different relationships and alliances with North Korea to its 
allies, enemies and the United Nations Security Council, associated patterns from history 
and configurations among other credible factors with the context in which these activities 
prevail. The focus is on the comprehension of dynamic and multi-dimensional evaluation 
                                                          
19 Tuang, Liang, Explaining North Korean Nuclear Weapons Motivations: Constructivism, Liberalism, and 
Realism, North Korean Review, 2013. 
20 Glenn Snyder. "The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror." Paul Seabury edition, The Balance of 
Power (San Francisco. Ca: Chandler, 1965): 185-201.  
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and examining the impact of realism on North Korea’s nuclear weapons and program. 
The arguments that pose throughout this paper revolves around different factors across 
time that facilitated and promoted nuclear proliferation by North Korea from a broader 
perspective. 
This paper hence focuses on phased engagements involving a chain of verifiable 
and significant reciprocal measures linking a broader spectrum of issues while evaluating 
diplomatic tools that have been employed in confronting nuclear proliferation and 
denuclearization efforts in North Korea. The paper clearly depicts the reality with the 
issue of the nuclear program in North Korea and the factors behind their stand and the 
reality that should be comprehended by the U.S. and the United Nations Security Council 
among other participants while pursuing their efforts to dissuade North Korea urging 
other nations to consider the historical grounding of the whole issue and strategize 
appropriately.21 The study will test various conclusions regarding the overall approach 
that should be adopted to address the North Korean predicament. 
       First Chapter: Discussion 
With North Korea committing to a classical realist perception of power as the 
overriding tool in international relations and negotiations, the country has persisted with 
military capability as a vital component of its survival through furtherance of nuclear 
weapons. As a result, the state was subjected to coercions by the United States. However, 
                                                          




coercion only increased North Korea’s urge to seek for more nuclear weapons.22 To this 
regard, other approaches besides coercion and application of pressure on North Korea 
remain the only option to restore sanity in the Korean Peninsula. This study, therefore, 
analyses two policies that have been undertaken to confront North Korea especially after 
the U.S. declared its unwillingness to engage the DPRK in any further sustained 
negotiations. 
With the resistance of the American public to engage the DPRK with war amid 
the hostile political climate, the right wing of the Republican party was keen for the U.S. 
to proceed with unilateral sanctions on North Korea in the early 1990’s.23 Without 
withstanding the internal distrust and external opposition, the Clinton presidency 
endeavored to reopen talks with DPRK. To this end, a plan to invoke a ‘carrot-and- stick’ 
approach towards the DPRK was reached with options of subjecting Pyongyang to 
sanctions while concurrently presenting ‘face-saving’ inducements to trigger its 
cooperation.24 
 Contrary to the expectations, North Korea turned down special inspection 
demands of the two nuclear waste sites that had been unreported by claiming to withdraw 
from the NPT despite the UNSC enforcing the April 1 compliances.  Economic aid to the 
state from the United Nations was terminated with acute reductions in cultural, technical, 
                                                          
22 Yoshifumi Ide, Akira Igata, Gibum Kim, Sung Hyo Kim, and Tong Zhao, "Conventional threats from the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)", Journal of International Relations 26, no. 3 (2016): 36.  
23 Leon V. Sigal, "The North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Understanding the Failure of the 'Crime and 
Punishment' Strategy," Arms Control Association, accessed July 4, 2017, 
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1997_05/sigal.  
24  David Cortnight and George A. Lopez, Carrots, Sticks and Cooperation: Economic Tools of Statecraft In 
Barrett Rubin, ed. Cases and Strategies for Preventative Action (New York: Century Foundation, 1998).   
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educational and economic exchanges. To worsen the consequences, the country was 
further imposed a complete ban on trade in arms and ballistic missile activity with 
resolution 1695.25 
Furthermore, the U.S discussed with China, South Korea, and Japan on attacking 
Yongbyon amid doubts that North Korea had started reprocessing spent fuel from cooling 
points, an inquiry to which all the three states sternly rejected premised on their national 
interests.26 Therefore, sanctions and embargos were only to be effective if the three states 
complied. To further discredit the possibility of sanctions succeeding, the spokesman of 
the ministry of foreign affairs of the time reiterated to the U.N. that imposing sanctions 
on the DPRK would be taken as a declaration of war. This led to a halt of deploying 
troops to Seoul as there was a sense of foreboding on Seoul if troops were to be 
deployed.27 
The United States began packaging all the spent fuel from Yongbyon in steel 
canister storages. It was thought beyond any reasonable doubt that North Korea was 
pursuing a covert nuclear program in 1999.   This increased suspicions that there were 
secret underground sites with nuclear reactors which led to the need for verification 
which North Korea detested and demanded monetary compensation before accepting.28 
                                                          
25 "North Korea's shadowy Arms Trade," theguardian, accessed July 4, 2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/18/history-north-korea-arms-dealing. 
26 Bruce W. Bennett, "Preparing for the Possibility of a North Korean Collapse" (Santa Monica: RAND 
Corporation, 2013).  
27  Shepherd, Iverson, "The Korean Peace Fund", North Korean Review 8 no. 2(2012): 62-75. 
doi:10.3172/nkr.8.2.62. 
28  Sachio Nakato, "North Korea's Fourth Nuclear Test: System Pressures, Decision Makers' Perceptions, 
and Foreign Policy." The Institute of Korean Studies 47, no.3 (2016): 630. 
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However, the economy of DPRK continued to decline with missiles playing an 
integral part in Pyongyang’s trade policy.29 This was a gap that could have been utilized 
by the U.S and the international community. This increased the possibility of Pyongyang 
acquiring nuclear expertise, equipment, and technology from Islamabad in return for 
missiles and other arsenals.30 
           North Korea postponed its decision after which Israel immediately resumed 
negotiations. Israel again complied to pressures from the U.S bowing out of negotiations 
shortly after which reports surfaced after just one year that it had resumed further 
negotiations with North Korea to assist in raising $1 billion towards a civilian scheme 
upon which DPRK pledged to restrain from the supply of No Dong missiles to Iran. 
Furthermore, North Korea continued with nuclear proliferation.30  
I studied historical data to examine and test how well realism explains North 
Korea's motivation to advance its nuclear program. Realist thinkers believe that military 
capability is a primal ingredient to international power. The first chapter proves North 
Korea committed to a classical realist perception of power as the overriding tool in 
international relations and negotiations. The realist school offers the most convincing 
fundamental explanation to the increasing desire to arm themselves with nuclear 
weapons. In other words, classical realism's meaning supports North Korean nuclear and 
political behavior. For example, North Korea signed an IAEA Safeguards agreement on 
                                                          
29  Chung Young-Chul, Kim Yong-Hyun, and Moon Kyungyon, "State Strategy in the Kim Jong-un Era: The 
'Byongjin' Policy of Pursuing Economic and Nuclear Development", The Institute of Korean Studies 47, no.1 
(2016): 18.  
30 Sachio Nakato, "North Korea's Fourth Nuclear Test: System Pressures, Decision Makers' Perceptions, 
and Foreign Policy," The Institute of Korean Studies 47, no.3 (2016): 642. 
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January 30, 1992 but did not allow inspectors to inspect two military sites, which 
supports the realist theory that all states desire power so that they can ensure their self-
preservation. Also, in the early 2000's, the U.S. and North Korea were both unsatisfied 
from the results of the Agreed Framework (with the U.S. angry at delayed inspections 
and North Korea angry at limited progress of their nuclear reactor). Many U.S. officials 
thought that North Korea was developing a highly enriched Uranium program but North 
Korea later admitted to having nuclear weapons for self-defense, which supports the 
realist theory that nations are actors in the international political system are rational as 
their actions maximize their own self-interest. Even with the signing of the "Statement of 
Principles" in 2005, both U.S. and North Korean officials disagreed a transfer of a light 
water reactor (lwr) to North Korea. While North Korea argued that it was justified to 
receive the light water reactor, the United States believed North Korea was not allowed to 
have the lwr, only after getting rid of its nuclear program, supporting the realist theory 
that the international political system is turbulent sa there is no authority that can enforce 
rules over states. With this regard, the hypothesis perfectly worked for this paper and 
clearly provides sound evidence that realism explains the origins of the North Korean 
nuclear program.  
      First Chapter: Conclusion 
For the U.S and the UNSC to successfully deter nuclear proliferation, there is 
need to continue to come up with real policies premised on reality to necessitate the easy 
selection of the right tools of international relations increasing the efficacy of the policy 
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instruments. While none of these policies have been tested or worked, it has nonetheless 
identified a possible avenue for America to approach the North Korean situation. North 
Korea surprised the international community through defiant provocative actions.   
 
    Second Chapter: Introduction 
The Republic of Korea (ROK) and the surrounding Asia-Pacific region has 
experienced periods of regional instability due to the Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea (DPRK) unpredictable behavior and the increase in nuclear capability from the 
People's Republic of China (PRC). Since exiting the Korean War with North Korea, in its 
early stages, the South Korean nuclear program initially started with the development of 
its first nuclear power reactor in 1970 but subsequently stopped the program by signing 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in April 1975.31 
Neorealism, a concept created by Kenneth Waltz, argues that power is the most critical 
concept in national development.32 Yet, South Korea purposefully chose to not create a 
strong nuclear weapon program despite advancements in nuclear capability from both 
North Korea and China. Why would South Korea stop pursuing developing their nuclear 
program when unpredictable neighboring countries such as North Korea possess one of 
the most capable nuclear weapons in the world?   
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  This thesis will outline and detail the origins of neorealism, the nuclear tension 
between North and South Korea (as its related to neorealism), and how South Korea is 
consistently searching for balance in the Pacific theater with many instances of 
imbalance.  South Korea is in a period of unpredictable times: the impeachment of former 
President Park Geun-Hye, the selection of current President Moon Jae-In, and the 
frequency of the North Korean nuclear weapon tests are causing uncertainty in an area 
where certainty needs to exist. 
            Second Chapter: Literature Review 
The threat of nuclear war remains a concern for most capable nations in the 21st 
century. The buildup of weapons in North Korea and the future missile increase in 
inventory in Iran has the potential to place the world in a state of frenzy. Military power 
is no longer directly correlated to economic growth within a nation. Using America as an 
example, their military dominance continues to prevail despite its economic turmoil 
experienced within the last couple of years in 2009 during the collapse of the housing 
market. Additionally, economic power provides security to states that are otherwise 
threatened by neighboring states. Indeed, nations that value the neorealism understand 
"power is the currency of international politics."33 Identifying what type of power (and 
more importantly, how much) is critical to a nation's success. 
On the subject of structural realism or neorealism, Kenneth Waltz identifies two 
concepts that define how states operate: the first being that the state systems represent an 
                                                          




anarchic structure rather than a hierarchy structure and the second is that the differences 
in the structure of these same systems is derived from the distribution of power.34 
Whereas Hans Morgenthau described human nature as to the reason states want power, 
structural realists under the neorealist theory argue it is more the structure that defines 
why states search for power.35 Another strong concept within realism is how the different 
types are somewhat related to each other (with the exception of structural realism, which 
is the same as neorealism). For example, Political realism argues that states are the 
aggressors of action in their area, they seek power, and they behave rationally.36 
Structural realism argues for states possessing the necessity to compete for power 
in order to stay afloat within the international community. Nations such as South Korea, 
according to the neorealism theory, must compete for power within their means to ensure 
they remain a strong ally to the United States and a formidable foe to North Korea. In 
fact, Mearsheimer argues that "great powers are trapped in an iron cage where they have 
little choice but to compete with each other for power if they hope to survive."37 What 
would be a better way to increase a nation's power besides expanding the nuclear 
program of a country? Why would South Korea specifically not choose to increase their 
power by not choosing to raise their nuclear capability? Does the structural realist theory 
explain South Korea's absence for their nuclear program?  
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The neorealist/structuralist criteria for states remains constant and does not 
particularly distinguish between unique national characteristics such as government type, 
political background, and economic capability. Neorealism does not take into account 
that states could actually behave differently between each other based on political 
identity. Additionally, there is a distinct difference between defensive and offensive 
realists under neorealism. Not only are they different in definition but also in their 
associated theorist's ideology.  Offensive realists insist that states must pursue power as 
much as possible while defensive realists understand that too much power is 
detrimental.38 Yet, the common denominator is power and its control. But more important 
than mere power to a nation is security. Throughout its history, South Korea is known for 
consistently trying to establish security within the Asia-Pacific region. China and North 
Korea are also working to establish security but they have a different definition. Whereas 
China and North Korea want supremacy by controlling security, South Korea desires 
safety for the Asia Pacific region. Not only is security the highest end in an anarchic 
state, power cannot become the standard that nations pursue if tranquility and peace are 
the objectives.39   
Another type of power, called latent power, is comprised of a nation's financial 
inventory that supports militaristic goals such as nuclear weapon programs through 
economic means.40 Structural realists understand that latent power defines the "raw 
                                                          
38 John J. Mearsheimer, Structural Realism, accessed June 12, 2017, 
http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/StructuralRealism.pdf. 
39  Robert Keohane, Neorealism and its Critics, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 127.  




potential" for a nation to influence competition from other rival states.41  Perhaps nations 
such as South Korea purposefully push for the control of power because "the power 
wielder affects the behavior, attitudes, beliefs, or propensity to act of another actor."42 
South Korea's ability to influence another nation's pursuit of nuclear weapons is clearly 
evident in North Korea. Understanding that North Korea will inevitably build up their 
arsenal as a result of the cooperation with the United States, South Korea exercises their 
latent power to counteract any potential attack from North Korea.  
Neorealists argue that its power's influence on others that gives its users the true 
power. To expand on this notion over the power of influence, Mearsheimer identifies five 
assumptions that neorealists argue for in the international community: first, nations 
operate in an anarchic state; second, nations contain some offensive capability; third, 
nations are uncertain of the intentions of other nations; fourth, nations regard survival as 
their top priority; and fifth, nations are rational actors.43 Although power is definitely a 
broad term that can be considered relative to a nation's values, great nations will always 
seek to compete and measure their progress with one another.  
Still, nations will push for opportunities to increase their power. This especially 
counts for the situation in South Korea.  T.V. Paul, the author of Power Versus Prudence, 
argues that realism makes true power, which is indicated by a country's national behavior 
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and nuclear acquisition.44 But what happens when nations are forced to look for other 
means to increase their power? Kenneth Waltz has questioned what drives nations to 
increase their proliferation under neorealism. Conversely, he also believed that the 
"thinking and perceptions of military leaders about the usefulness of nuclear weapons 
move far afield from the normal comfort zone of neo-realism."45 Yet, neorealism 
supports the structural realist concept that proliferation and power seemingly go hand in 
hand because must compete for power within their means to maintain their alliance with 
the United States and counterattack any threat from North Korea. Just because neo 
realism does not define specific structures that are desired within power (political, 
economic, or militarily), does not mean it is not related to the pursuit of power.  
Also, if South Korea is aware of North Korea's desire to increase their nuclear 
capability, why would they not follow the concept to raise their power? South Korea is 
relying on the United States for defense against North Korea through AEGIS KDX ship 
upgrades, THAAD deployment, and the increased military presence in the Asia-Pacific 
theater. South Korea can remain a strong economic nation while simultaneously 
providing its own defense against North Korea by developing their own nuclear weapon 
program. Well known author Scott Sagan states that "states will seek to develop nuclear 
weapons when they face a significant military threat to their security that cannot be met 
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through alternative means; if they do not face such threats they will willingly remain non-
nuclear states."46  
So, the next question must be why South Korea has remained passive and 
willingly accept their status as a non-nuclear state? In more recent times, South Korea is 
pursuing security and ballistic missile upgrades in response to North Korean 
provocations. According to Won Yoo-Chul, a high-ranked official within the South 
Korean conservative party, stated his country should create 'peaceful' nuclear weapons to 
counterattack the North-Korean 'fearful and self-destructive ones.'47 The reasoning for the 
absence South Korea's nuclear program was because of pressure from the United States 
to join the NPT. Nonetheless, South Korea contains nuclear deterrence since they 
covertly conducted nuclear experiments by admitting to the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) to conducting secret nuclear experiments in 2004.48 This supports 
Mearsheimer's neorealist argument that states nations maintain some offensive capability, 
they are uncertain of actions from other nations, and that they are rational actors. It is 
clearly evident that the "absence" of the South Korean nuclear program has roots traced 
to neo-realism.  
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The security dilemma states a strong and powerful nation increases its own 
security at the expense of other nations.49 Perhaps this is what occurred in South Korea 
with neighboring countries such as Japan and North Korea increased their military 
capabilities, which would support the structural realist theory.  
What security calls for is a balance, regardless of any of region located around the 
world. From North Korea's perspective, the balance concept is arguably the reason why 
they pursue nuclear weapons, which would add another dimension to the security 
dilemma. The one concept that both offensive and defense realists can agree on is a 
balance. While offensive realist state pursuing power provides balance to a powerful 
nation, defensive realists suggest seeking too much power would create an imbalance. 
Moreover, defensive realists insist when nations look for more power (take the case in 
North Korea), balancing will occur in which other militaries from other nations form and 
work together to create a coalition to decrease the power given out.50 
   Second Chapter: Theory and Hypothesis 
  Neo-realist theory tells us that states are competitive power seekers that will 
inevitably lead to anarchical interactions within the international system.51 My theory 
holds that South Korea purposefully chose not to pursue a nuclear capability in order to 
avoid confrontation with North Korea. South Korea fully understands because that the 
United States supports them through military technology and support, the peace desired 
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in the Pacific theater will ultimately be decided on how South Korea confronts the 
unacceptable and provoking actions from North Korea. Neorealism supports this South 
Korean concept: "while international structures can condition the behavior of nation-
states, these in turn are ultimately determined by the interaction of nation-states 
themselves."52 The U.S.-South Korean alliance will influence the lack of respect from 
North Korea but it is the interaction between South and the North that will have the real 
impact to the Asia Pacific future.  
Understanding South Korea not wanting a direct interaction with North Korea is 
reasonable; the nation is an economic powerhouse neighboring an unreliable and militant 




      Second Chapter: Methods 
 
The research question will be answered by studying how nuclear-capable South 
Korea has become since the end of the Korean War. The evidence gathered will be a 
combination of data, arguments, and conclusions about the South Korean nuclear 
program in the past and in the present. Initially, this will include a brief historical 
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reference to South Korea's past about nuclear weapons. Then, neorealism will be tested 
against the reasoning in the absence of South Korea's nuclear program.  
 
        Second Chapter: Data 
The United States and South Korea have been economic and militaristic 
cooperative partners since the conclusion of the Korean War in the 1950's. South Korea 
has since relied on the United States for military protection through deployment of 
thousands of U.S. soldiers, Aegis ships, Terminal High Altitude Area Air Defense 
(THAAD) system, and maintaining a ballistic missile arsenal. Dictator General Park 
Chung-Hee, South Korean leader during the 1970's, expressed a strong desire to gather 
material to create a nuclear weapons capability.53 The mid 1970's marked a period where 
South Korea was attempting to create its own nuclear agenda and identity. Numerous 
entities reported that General Park was serious about separating South Korea from its 
competitors in the nuclear capability field, purposefully leading scientists to create atomic 
bombs by the late 1970's in order to protect South Korea from the North.54  
The United States' leadership were confused about the recent nuclear 
development desires from South Korea in the 1970's. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
received numerous reports that South Korea wanted protection from North Korea in 
nuclear development. In fact, he learned that South Korea was "negotiating with France 
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to purchase a chemical separation plant, which could be used to produce plutonium from 
spent reactor fuel."55 The United States government felt somewhat uneasy about South 
Korea pursuing its own nuclear program for several reasons. First, how would South 
Korea respond to North Korea provocations initially? Would they perform a pre-emptive 
nuclear strike or retaliate from an earlier attack? Additionally, preventing a nuclear war 
with both South and North Korea could prove exhausting to America. Not only would a 
South Korean nuclear program cause regional instability, the United States would have to 
provide much more than leverage from other countries to prevent South Korea from 
going far against North Korea should a nuclear war occur.56 The United States was 
ultimately determined to discourage the South Korean thought to produce nuclear 
capability, believing the idea would only cause more problems than solutions if pursued. 
On the other hand, South Korean leadership was strongly convinced that the United 
States would abandon them in the event of a conflict or war. It soon became known that 
both sides suffered from the mistrust of each other. 
The United States continuously studied and tracked how fast South Korea could 
develop a nuclear program. Observing President Park's intentions and actions, National 
Intelligence officers under the leadership of the director of Central Intelligence concluded 
that "South Korea could have a nuclear weapons capability and missile delivery systems 
within ten years."57 This additional fact fueled America's pursuit to put a halt on South 
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Korea's intentions for a nuclear weapons capability.  Perhaps South Korea's proliferation 
would undermine the United States' willingness to render assistance should a nuclear war 
occur is why the American government was so desperate to control them. Although the 
actual paper is still considered classified, the premise that South Korea had an ability to 
grow in a fast rate haunted the United States government.  
South Korea's nuclear proliferation did not only affect the United States and 
North Korea. According to the State Department telegram 048673, South Korea 
possessing numerous nuclear weapons could also cause instability where nations such as 
People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia would join in an alliance with North Korea 
to diminish the South Korean nuclear inventory.58 The United States wanted to eliminate 
any possibilities of rival nations forming an alliance, especially during the Cold War era. 
The repercussions for an established South Korean nuclear program would inevitably 
cause issues within the bilateral security for the region.59 
The United States has considered the alternative option that South Korea might 
desire nuclear materials for other reasons besides weaponry. Yet, regardless of the 
reasons, the United States government felt every justifiable reason for South Korea to 
create a nuclear program ran contrary to the interests of the United States.60 Allowing 
South Korea to create their nuclear program would also send a sign to other American 
allies that they are allowed to pursue nuclear programs on their own terms as well. 
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Clearly, this was not the message that America did not want to send within the 
international community. A nuclear South Korea meant militarily, economic and political 
repercussions that America was not willing to confront.61 Hence, this presented another 
reason for America to urge South Korea to ratify the NPT.  
The United States was not the only nation concerned with South Korea possessing 
nuclear weapons. On June 17, 1975, nuclear suppliers met in London to go over 
regulation for nuclear material exportation. At the meeting, Canadian diplomats and their 
leadership stated concerns over the South Korean nuclear regime agenda.62 The 
Canadians worked closely with the South Koreans for nuclear reactor development. Yet, 
the Canadians wanted a closer eye and supervision about the reprocessing for the reactor. 
Canada mandated that mutual consent was required in order to provide nuclear fuel for 
their reactors.63 South Korea learned quickly that more capabilities meant more 
responsibilities.  
On July 3, 1975, Canadian Minister of External Affairs Alan MacEachen met 
with South Korean President Park to discuss South Korea's agenda on pursuing a nuclear 
program. President Park stated that the ROK has no intention to pursue nuclear weapons 
because the possibility of a pre-emptive strike from the PRC or the USSR would be 
highly likely in that situation.64 This confused MacEachen, since President Park admitted 
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to the Canadian Trade Minister Allistair Gillespie that ROK needed a nuclear program 
because of the United States withdrawal of the "nuclear umbrella."65 
South Korean leadership, in particular Park, truly questioned the reliability of the 
U.S. military against the North Korean nuclear threat. Specifically, it was the Nixon's 
administration's choice to take back a U.S. Army division that made Park uneasy against 
the protection in future nuclear clashes with North Korea.66 Park secretly conspired with 
his leadership to create plans for developing a strong South Korean nuclear program. He 
researched fissile material, constructed ideas for future plans, and devised strategies for 
increasing the nuclear capability without letting America know. Yet, America found out 
about Park's intentions. However, South Korea remained steadfast and determined to 
create a well-developed nuclear program by insisting their program would be for 
"peaceful purposes."67 
 As the years passed, South Korea had cemented itself into the peaceful reason for 
pursuing a nuclear program. South Korea, by the mid 1970's, had to adhere to the 
peaceful intentions it expressed early on when its leadership ratified the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty.68 While the motive for peace was clear, South Korea still 
expressed unwavering determination to not only possess a strong nuclear capability. 
South Korea felt standing idly by while nations such as Japan and North Korea increased 
their nuclear payload and arsenal was unacceptable. Park understood a nuclear program 
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would possibly mean separation from the United States and he was willing to pay that 
price. While Park focused on nuclear material development, creating nuclear weapons 
would mean much more severe consequences. Moreover, weapons development would 
have required a renunciation of the Nonproliferation Treaty, which would have set off an 
international crisis between the United States and South Korea.  
South Korea's government received immense pressure from American leadership 
to validate the NPT. For example, on February 26, 1975, Ambassador to Seoul Richard 
Sneider urged South Korea to ratify the NPT earlier than expected to contain the nuclear 
proliferation issue and "would serve to help in the international arena."69 Part of the 
reason for the meeting was to control the fast pace South Korea's government was 
moving towards for nuclear proliferation. The speed at which South Korea moved was 
deemed troublesome from the United States government. Other countries in the 
international community such as France were also being reached out to by South Korea 
for assistance in growing their nuclear capability. At the time of the meeting at the U.S. 
Embassy Seoul, Canadian First Secretary Longhuir informed the audience that South 
Korean President Park had already made the decision to ratify the NPT.70 
Although South Korea signed the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1968, 
President Park still believed in weighing in his nuclear option by acquiring a capability to 
"separate plutonium" intended for nuclear weapons.71 South Korea arrived at a political 
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crossroads: provide more protection through nuclear capability or continue to rely on the 
United States for protection? Ultimately, South Korea chose the second option of 
continuing to hold the United States as an important ally. Yet, the Republic of Korea 
(ROK) remained steadfast to their decision. South Korea's decision to remain a non-
nuclear state led to the "Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the 
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" that defined both the ROK and Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) will not be in possession of nuclear or uranium 
capabilities.72 1992 marked a period where both North and South Korea would not utilize 
any means of developing, increasing, or gaining access to nuclear weapons or capability. 
This was simple for South Korea since the previous years meant weapons protection from 
the United States. South Korea's International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) agreement 
also held the nation to utilize America's protection vice their own nuclear capability. 
Throughout the years, North Korea has been in clear violation of the Joint Declaration on 
the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula by purposefully hiding their nuclear 
capability. Nonetheless, South Korea has remained professional and in most cases honest 
about their lack of a nuclear capability.  
Although there is no South Korean nuclear capability per se, the ROK has been 
discovered to have conducted nuclear experiments in the past after 1992. Specifically, 
South Korea admitted to testing nuclear tests at the Korea Atomic Energy Research 
Institution (KAERI).73 South Korean leadership understood what a nuclear state meant: 
                                                          





more scrutiny from the United States, more reliance on nuclear power to finance their 
economy, and more observance from North Korea. Although the South Korean 
government at the time denied being aware of the nuclear experiments conducted, there is 
evidence that suggests this is false according to the IAEA investigations at the time.74 
This discovery eroded trust from several entities and countries that were planning to 
assist South Korea with the development of their nuclear capabilities but have since 
withdrawn their assistance.75  
 
     Second Chapter: Discussion 
South Korea fits the neorealism concept: all states aim to acquire power and state 
cooperation can only be temporary.76 South Korea also fits some of the tenets in classical 
realism in that states are unitary, rational actors seeking relative gains, and are the actors 
in international politics.77 The reasons why theorists questioned classical realism and 
transition to the theory of neorealism is sort of the explanation of what happened between 
the United States and South Korea during the 1970's. The decrease of war and increase in 
alliances allowed theorists to question if states cooperation is truly temporary.  
South Korea's leadership fought for the same values under neorealism. Neorealists 
are similar to realists but have several distinctions in values between them. For instance, 
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neorealists are more concerned with security and survival than power.78 This was the 
same for South Korea: President Park was concerned for South Korea's survival after the 
United States withdrew their troops. The telegram documentation that came from the 
discussion at the U.S. Embassy Seoul suggests South Korea was legitimately concerned 
for the safety against the North Korean nuclear threat. Although South Korea was also 
competing against other nations that possessed nuclear capability, they wanted security 
either through a strong nuclear capability or from the United States.  
Power is conceptually different from both realists and non-realists. Power to 
neorealists means security and realists believe it is an end to itself.79 Power also explains 
why the United States became hesitant to allow South Korea with a nuclear capability. 
Once a state achieves a certain threshold of power, it is human nature to desire more 
power. One of the chief concerns for the United States also included South Korea's lust 
for more security than the United States protection. Forcing South Korea to ratify the 
NPT meant they would stay controlled by the United States and not request additional 
security through nuclear means, which could possibly risk bilateral security in the Asia 
Pacific region. The negotiations between American, South Korean, and Canadian 
leadership contributed to the neorealism concept. Negotiations highlight the "power 
politics that are institutionalized in organizations reflecting the security needs of the big 
powers."80 Canada and the United States used negotiations to calm the involved politics 
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of South Korea's security issues. The negotiations showed "who's who" with respect to 
big powers and truly dissecting the utility of a strong South Korean nuclear program.  
Neorealism argues that cooperation is not possible because states must choose 
'relative gains' (self-help) over 'absolute gains' (international cooperative).81 President 
Park attempted to choose relative gains and did not necessarily rely on cooperation. 
Additionally, the United States did not cooperate with South Korea's wishes. South Korea 
did not cooperate with the United States when their leadership ratified the NPT. Instead, 
the United States pressured and forced them to sign. In fact, neorealists argue cooperation 
is more likely to be executed in economic policies rather than military mobilization. To 
the neorealists, the power concept is simply a tool to balance how much control one 
nation has over another.  
Neorealism has a tendency to focus on conflict instead of cooperation due to its 
emphasis on the significance of "non-structural factors" that control states' policies.82 The 
conflict between the South Korean and American stance on nuclear proliferation caused 
the changes to ratify the NPT, not the desire to create a stronger alliance. A cooperation 
between the United States and South Korea without nuclear weapons would be irrelevant 
since neo-realism references conflict, not cooperation. This supports the notion that 
neorealism is the reason for the non-existence of the South Korean nuclear program.  
 
     Second Chapter: Conclusion 
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The lack of a nuclear program in South Korea will continue to bring balance and 
stability in an unpredictable "hot spot" within the world since the United States has a 
dominant presence in the Korean peninsula. A realist would argue that a South Korean 
nuclear program would not bring balance and stability to the Korean peninsula because 
human nature dictates that we are in a constant quest for power. The United States-South 
Korean relationship is a vital security pact that will continue to provide protection against 
the North Korean regime. Neorealism explains the absence of South Korea's nuclear 
program to define that security through power is what a state truly needs in order to 
thrive.  
                            Third Chapter Introduction 
In the recent past, China has been expanding and modernizing its military 
capabilities. Notably, the country has been increasing its nuclear arsenal. The goal of the 
nuclear weapon and the delivery systems expansion is seen as an effort to ensure that 
China maintains an effective nuclear second-strike capability concerning the U.S.83 
Realism is used as one of the explanations for the steady rise in nuclear weaponry 
attributing the expansion to China’s perception of the existing threats. The defense 
system of the U.S. and its advancement is seen as a threat to China's second-strike 
capability necessitating the development of its arsenal as an effective political leverage.84 
The nuclear program was initiated in the mid-1950s and proceeded to carry out the first 
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test in 1964 after which a total of 45 other tests have been undertaken.85 The country has 
tested the full range of nuclear weapons including uranium bombs, neutron arms, and 
thermonuclear warheads. Initially, China committed never to be the first to use a nuclear 
weapon or threaten their use but to use them for deterrence and for the capability to 
retaliate. The stance changed with the publication in 2013 of China's "nuclear self-
defense strategy” which does not explicitly rule out the possibility of first use.86 While its 
nuclear arsenal is small compared to that of the U.S., it is estimated that between 2002 
and 2010 its nuclear warheads increased from 20 to 30-35 representing almost 50-75 
percent growth in under a decade.87 Realists hold that power is the currency of 
international politics. The great powers will thus keep track of their economic and 
military powers and how these capabilities compare with those of competitors. It is in 
their interest to accumulate power but and also to ensure that no other country 
significantly shifts the existing balance of power.88 
  The study will seek to evaluate the effectiveness of the concept of realism in 
explaining the growth of China's nuclear weaponry. The aim is to determine whether 
realism satisfactorily accounts for the rise in nuclear power or alternative explanations 
need to be explored. The method that will be employed is through a critical review of the 
literature on the subject. Past studies that will be evaluated are the realism theoretical 
underpinnings and the realities of past, present and potential conflicts. The hypothesis of 
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the paper is that realism is an appropriate means of explaining the growth in China's 
nuclear capabilities. 
 
        Third Chapter Literature Review 
 One of the main assumptions of the classical view is that states constitute unitary 
actors seeking to maximize power and guarantee their survival in the international 
system.89 Classical realists emphasize the external pressures to safeguard their interests. 
However, opponents of this view fault it on the basis that it oversimplifies nuclear 
decision making. Kenneth Waltz explains the spread of nuclear weapons through rational 
deterrence in what became the beginning of neo-realism in which he observes that the 
acquisition of second strike capability reduces the likelihood of war between nuclear 
states.90 Thus, Waltz argues that the spread of nuclear weapons is better and is likely to 
increase stability through restraint and caution; a view that contradicts with the classical 
conclusion. However, in practice, the view of nuclear weapons changed from the 1960s, 
and they became to be feared rather than being seen as means of enhancing stability.  
Waltz’s neorealism differs with the classical views as he observes that military leaders do 
not like uncertainty, and thus even autocratic regimes are unlikely to develop nuclear 
weapons.91 The implication of Waltz’s work is that the nuclear decisions come down to 
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the individual or organizational level rather than the assumption of a unitary state actor in 
the classical view.92 He argues that a vertical proliferation would exhaust state resources 
without guaranteeing a security enhancement and therefore would be counterproductive. 
Davis argues that classical realism provides a complete explanation to 
proliferation where countries undertake nuclear programs if they improve their national 
security.93 However, the view fails to account for instances where some states acquire 
nuclear weapons while such acquisition undermines their security. Drawing from the 
anarchic international structure, Betts argues that a nation that is more isolated, seeking 
international prestige or is facing threats from a neighboring adversary is more likely to 
pursue a buildup of its nuclear weaponry.94  
Neorealists argue that the structure of the international system and whether it is 
characterized as being unipolar, bipolar or multipolar has an effect on both international 
politics and outcomes.95 Nuclear weapons would be an effective way by weaker states of 
balancing stronger ones is such international structure. Not everyone subscribes to the 
realism perspective. Proponents of the neoliberal institutionalism argue for having 
international institutions that would alleviate the security dilemma and ensure long-term 
cooperation among states.96 They observe that the NPT has been mandated to regulate the 
relations between nuclear states on one side and non-nuclear weapon states on the other 
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and has been credited for by some for the low proliferation. However, its operations have 
been plagued with allegations of bias and discrimination and offer weak security 
guarantees for its non-nuclear members.97 With such skepticism, it is likely that non-
nuclear members and weak states would advance programs to build their nuclear arsenals 
to counter threats posed by strong members. Nevertheless, the arms race predicted by this 
view has not been witnessed in reality. Neoliberal institutionalists hold that domestic 
characteristics play a significant role in shaping attitudes towards nuclear proliferation.  
These views reduce the dichotomy placed on domestic and foreign policies and instead 
show their interconnectedness and how they reinforce each other.  
The “myth of nuclear proliferation” argument is to the effect that the discussion is 
a result of a narrative that paints a gloomy global security status.98 Further, this is seen as 
a mischaracterization that depicts the system as unstable. As long as it persists, 
proponents argue that it will continue to justify wasteful military spending. 
Unfortunately, it largely damages the national security rather than enhancing it.99  
Concerning the question of how much power is enough; defensive realists hold 
that it is foolhardy to make an attempt at maximizing a state's share of world power. They 
hold that the international system will punish such attempts especially hegemony by 
bringing together adversaries for form an alliance against the aggressor.100 The view 
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contradicts that of offensive realists who observe a strategic sense for nations to 
accumulate as much power as possible, even hegemony under the right circumstances.101 
The argument relies on the assumption that overwhelming power is the sure way of 
guaranteeing survival, the ultimate goal of power.  
Benjamin Frankel argued for a logical deductive approach.102 With the advantage 
of hindsight now, it is evident that international norms regarding the use of force have 
greatly changed. Force is only justifiable in self-defense and in enforcing international 
law sanctioned by the UN Security Council.103 Stringent conditions have been placed on 
the use of force and emphasis put on the protection of civilians. Thus, it is inconceivable 
that the application of nuclear weapons would be sanctioned in the current regime. While 
adherence is not guaranteed, states have demonstrated restraint in the use of force. Thus, 
nuclear nonproliferation has gained momentum in the recent years reflecting a new 
outlook in the global structure.104  
 The approach allows for the functional differentiation of nations and is based on 
the fact that the operating environment is dynamic and states do not merely imitate each 
other.105 As such, it is not easy to predict proliferation as traditional neo-realists had 
attempted to do. The theory thus seeks to provide insight to domestic and foreign policy 
                                                          
101 Douglas, James. “Defensive Realism and Chinese Maritime Strategy.” Victoria University of 
Wellington, pp1-90. 
102 Frankel Benjamin. “The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation, 
Security Studies 2, 1993, p. 37. 
103 Mearsheimer, John, J. International Relations Theories: Structural Realism, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013. 
104 Ibid, pg. 13. 
105 Buzan Barry, Jones Charles, and Little Richard. The Logic of Anarchy: Neo-Realism to Structural 
Realism.  
New York, Columbia University Press, 1993, pp102-114. 
47 
 
decision-making as opposed to prescribing or accurately predicting future behavior of 
states. The structural realism model (vice the classic realist model) is more realistic as it 
takes into consideration more influences considering the dilemma between survival in the 
global structure and internal stability of a state. It comes closer to simulating a real 
scenario that faces a nation that is to decide whether to adopt or expand its nuclear 
arsenal. Such country has to take into account factors such as the presence of adversaries, 
presence, and reliability of allies, the existing distribution of power among international 
players as well as domestic concerns such as technological capability, political stability, 
and economic strength.106   
 Reiss' views are that nuclear restraints have been underestimated. These include 
domestic ones including cost, environmental risks, political opposition and external 
influences such as bilateral disincentives and the power of “world public opinion” that 
removes the interest of nations developing nuclear arsenal.107 These disincentives have 
had the effect of convincing policy makers that the benefits of nuclear weapons would be 
lower than anticipated thus slowing the adoption of a nuclear arsenal. Also, like other 
structural realists, Reiss argue that the motivation for nuclear proliferation vary across 
nations.  
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Classical theorists argue that everyone is born with a will to power and the 
aspirations of the great powers represent a sum of the individual desires of its rulers.108 
On the other hand, structural realists argue that it is the structure of the international 
system that pushes nations to pursue power.109 The fact that the great powers have no 
authority above them implies that there exists no guarantee that another competitor will 
not attack the victim state.110 Thus, it becomes sensible that every nation builds the 
capability to defend itself if it becomes a subject of an assault. As such, the great powers 
have become trapped in a race to compete for survival particularly through enhancing 
their military capacities.  
Power is interpreted as being a function of a state’s military assets including 
nuclear weapons. Besides, the socioeconomic ingredients that enable such accumulation 
of property constitute latent power.111 These include a state's wealth, the population size, 
and technology. A country can only enhance its ability to thrive on the capacity to protect 
this pool of assets from aggression. It is thus evident that as economies grow so does their 
military budgets and arsenal. These efforts aim at keeping at bay any attempts to curtail 
the economy’s growth particularly by its competitors who may be keen to maintain the 
status quo.  
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Structural realism has identified five fundamental assumptions on which the 
theory of international structure is based. First, structural realism assumes that great 
powers are the key players in global politics and they operate in an anarchic system in the 
sense that there lacks a centralized authority and thus no arbiter above the nations.112 The 
implication of this assumption is that each great power must depend on itself for survival. 
Secondly, it is assumed that all nations have some extent of military capability, which 
varies among states and within a state over time. The second assumption leads to a 
dichotomy of countries by those that are content with the existing status quo and those 
that pursue to revise the current balance of power. Thirdly, it is assumed that nations 
cannot be certain regarding the intentions of other states to use force to alter the balance 
of authority or whether they are satisfied with the current structure.113 The reason is that 
intentions are difficult to discern and speeches and policy documents can be used 
deceptively to conceal the real intentions.114 Also, even when intentions are discernable, 
they are not static (as indicated in the second assumption) and change depending on the 
regime in power. Fourthly, the primary goal of nations is survival concerning the ability 
to retaining the autonomy in the domestic political order and territorial integrity. All other 
aims are secondary as they presume the survival of the state. The last assumption states 
that nations are rational actors with the ability to develop strategies that maximize the 
survival prospects. However, this does not prevent miscalculation among actors owing to 
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the imperfect information that characterizes their operational environment. At times the 
miscalculation leads to severe mishaps and costly decisions. The combination of these 
assumptions creates an incentive for states to acquire power at the detriment of their 
competitors.115 
The theory of structural realism states that great powers fear each other and 
mistrust characterizes their relationship. There is concern regarding the intentions of 
other actors and particularly on the capability and motive to launch attacks against them. 
The situation creates a scenario where there is a lingering possibility of war and state 
destruction. In their operations, great powers understand that their operational 
environment is a self-help world.116 They can only depend on themselves for survival as 
other nations pose potential threats and there lacks a higher authority to rely on in case of 
an attack. Thus, there is a motivation to be powerful compared to rivals so as to reduce 
the likelihood of being attacked. While it is true nations form alliances to deal with 
adversaries, it is clear that even in such arrangements national interests supersede those of 
the international community.117 Because no state would like a situation where another 
gains power at its expense, it ensures that even those that are satisfied with the status quo 
will operate like revisionist states when there is this threat.118 
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The nature of the international system and its anarchic organization implies that 
every state that is seeking to survive must assume the worst case regarding the intentions 
of its competitors' appetite to compete for power. Thus, it is impossible to conceive a 
situation where there are peace and contentment among the great powers and where every 
one of them is satisfied with the status quo.119 The structural implications lead to a 
security dilemma as the steps taken to enhance the security of one state decreases the 
relative power of its competitors. The resultant effect is a zero-sum world in which 
improving the survival prospects of one nation can only be realized by threatening the 
ability of other states to thrive. In turn, the affected ones will be motivated to adopt 
measures that guarantee survival leading to constant competition for power.  
While offensive realists argue that states should seize every moment to increase 
power, defensive theorists hold that it is not strategic to pursue hegemony.120 They 
advocate for what they term as an "appropriate amount of power." The view is informed 
by an argument that if any state were to become too powerful, then balancing would take 
place by a process whereby the other great powers enhance their military capabilities or 
form a coalition that either makes the aspiring hegemony less secure or destroys it.121 
Another argument by defensive realists is that there exists an offence-defense balance 
which indicates the ease with which a territory can be defeated. The balance is found to 
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be heavily weighed for the defender implying that any nation keen on increasing power 
through offense is likely to engage in a series of losing wars. Because of the futility of the 
exercise, states will be keen on maintaining their position in the balance of power as 
opposed to creating hegemony.122 Further, it is argued that even where conquest was 
possible, its costs outweigh the benefits. Nationalism ensures that the conqueror is unable 
to subdue the conquered as the likelihood of occupied populations rising against the 
occupier are high. These factors limit the appetite for power among great powers. 
Because they are rational actors, they will be less inclined to amass much relative power 
as this would threaten their survival in the long run.  
Offensive realists contest these views. They observe that the balancing carried out 
by threatened nations is often inefficient, a situation which makes it possible for an 
aggressor to take advantage of its foes. Buck- passing by some states is common among 
great powers where they choose to stay on the sidelines instead of joining a balancing 
coalition increasing the likelihood of aggression.123 Besides, offensive realists point out 
that historical record does not support the assertion that the defender has a significant 
advantage over the aggressor. There is an extensive account of wars where the aggressor 
has ended up defeating the targeted nation.  
Both offensive and defensive realists concur that there is little utility in the use of 
nuclear weapons offensively where both parties have access to them. The reasoning is 
that where both parties have a survivable retaliatory capability, none of the parties gain 
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from striking first.124 As a consequence, there is a consensus among these different 
groups of theorists that war between nuclear-armed nations is possible but unlikely given 
the possibility of it escalating to the nuclear level. Therefore, the ultimate reason for 
building and increasing nuclear power is ensuring that there is a clear communication of 
the retaliatory ability and thus effective deterrence as opposed to provocation.125  
                                Third Chapter Hypothesis 
The study’s hypothesis is that China’s nuclear program is a rational decision 
meant to enhance its survivability through deterrence. Consequently, realism would be an 
appropriate method to explain China’s program to account for this objective and for any 
nuclear program. There is little attention that is given to the recent developments where 
China has adopted a more open economy increasing its reliance on the global system of 
nations. Thus, the economic progress of China would raise the cost of it engaging in a 
nuclear war and thus would be naturally unwelcome. It is important to update the current 
literature to reflect the realities that China faces in the current international system. These 
experiences will be evaluated against the characteristics of realism to establish 
consistencies and inconsistencies with the theory.  
  
     Third Chapter Method 
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A qualitative analytical method similar to the one used in Himm will be utilized to 
consider China's nuclear program's role in implementing the policy of deterrence.126  A 
critical analysis of the historical evolution and modernization of China's nuclear arsenal 
will be made based on the experience concerning the assumptions made under realism to 
bring out points of concurrence or contradictions. Government policy over time will be 
analyzed to bring out trends as well as rhetoric and credibility of such assertions. The 
development of the Chinese nuclear program will be assessed not in isolation but with a 
particular focus on the events in the South and East China seas, the U.S, and the latter's 
allies in the region. The global size of nuclear weaponry will be considered as well as 
where China appears in the hierarchy. The size of the China's nuclear weapon will be 
considered as well as how it has changed over time and its prospects.127 The analysis will 
seek to establish the assertions of China on one side and those of its potential adversaries 
on the other. Open sources will be used to determine the veracity of the claims and 
qualitative evidence on the issue. The method will also consider the operational 
environment of China considering particularly its economic growth and its strategic 
interests. Such methodology is informed by the need to understand the nuclear program 
within the broad context of the survivability of the state, a key assumption of the realism.  
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China's "underground great wall" consists of 3000 miles of long tunnels with the 
capacity to hold approximately 3000 nuclear weapons.128 The tunnel system has decoy 
portals intended to prevent adversaries from carrying out successful first strikes. It has 
been estimated that China would consider ten warheads that can be detonated in 10 
enemy major cities sufficient for its deterrence objectives. The estimated fatalities per 
nuclear missile are estimated at 800,000, and if it is detonated as an airburst, the figure 
goes up to 2 million. Even in the instance of a counterattack involving 20 DF-31A 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with lower-yield warhead compared to a DF-
5A, casualties are estimated at 12 million with up to 6 million fatalities.129 Some authors 
estimate China’s inventory at 170 nuclear warheads with about 110 operational 
deployable missiles, 35 of which could reach intercontinental U.S. and about 60 are for 
the submarine-launched ballistic missiles and bombers.130 
The country has about 1.8 tons of plutonium and 16 tons of weapon-grade HEU 
for making nuclear weapons. It is notable that the country halted the production of 
enriched uranium in 1987 and of plutonium in 1990.131 The facilities used for these 
productions have been closed, are being decommissioned or have been converted to other 
purposes. Existing stockpiles of fissile materials cannot support more than 1000 
warheads. As standard practice, some of this material has to be set aside for future needs. 
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Adherence to this practice would put the upper limit of the nuclear arsenal at 500 
warheads. The modernization of the nuclear arsenal was done at a moderate rate between 
1980 and 1985 at a time when nuclear threat was low. However, from the mid-1990s with 
the onset of the Taiwan crisis, the program has been upscaled.  
On April 2016, China tested DF-41, its newest ICBM which has MIRV 
capabilities indicating an intention to replace the DF-31 which can only hold one 
warhead and uses liquid fuel propellant. The country has comparatively fewer nuclear 
tests pointing to the fact that the existing designs are satisfactory. The increasing striking 
range and promptness of launch associated with the switch from liquid to solid fuel point 
to improvements in deliverability of the new missiles.132 The switch from liquid to solid 
fuel has been undertaken in a span of 30 years.  
Though China abandoned production of military grade plutonium, it could resume 
with ease given that it has increased the number of reprocessing and fast breeder reactors. 
Some authors have argued that the sole purpose of the new H-6K strategic bomber is to 
target American carrier groups and targets in East Asia. However, this long-range bomber 
lacks the requisite range to target the U.S. mainland.133 A clear disparity between China 
and other nuclear nations is that its warheads and launch vehicles are held separately and 
are only mated when ready for launch.134 
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The secrecy of China's nuclear weapon program has been described as deceptive 
and is intended to enhance the survivability of its arsenal for retaliatory purposes. Public 
access of the  
information would undermine the arsenal's role in deterrence. The comparatively fewer 
weapons and low alert status create strategic vulnerabilities to an aggressor keen of 
destroying China's capability to respond. The country has made efforts to modernize the 
command control communication and intelligence (C3I) capabilities.135 These 
developments enhance the ability to command and control several units, give access to 
battlefield information, sustained communication connections and capacity to issue 
orders via voice commands to various subordinates.  
China’s stockpiles of nuclear warheads have not changed significantly in the 
recent years.136 Compared to other nuclear nations, China's nuclear force is smaller and 
technologically unsophisticated. Its missiles are kept un-fueled, off-alert, and their 
warheads are stored separately increasing their preparation time.137 Moreover, there is a 
heavy reliance on land-based systems with its sea- and air-based components remaining 
relatively underdeveloped. The SSBN has been plagued with recurrent technical hitches 
and so has been the case with the Xia-class submarine which has been said never to have 
left port or conducted any deterrent patrol.138 Some analysts intimate that China has only 
strategic nuclear weapons and no tactical ones. The country seems to have elected not to 
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pursue the multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) that would have 
seen every missile fitted with several warheads.  
Although the country modernized the delivery vehicles, no evidence exists of 
developing new warheads. It signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and since 1996 
has not tested nuclear weapons.139 The country has the least relative number of test data, 
and a precursor of resuming development of nuclear weapons would be testing. There 
lacks hard evidence of a move towards a bias for more testing.  
Its chief adversary, the U.S., has numerous allies in the region posing an increased 
threat. The uncertainty about Tibet and differing opinions between China and the U.S 
demands that it acts in a manner to safeguard its territorial interests.140 This uncertainty 
means that China does not have the capacity to "sprint" to the level of nuclear arsenal 
controlled by the U.S. or Russia. China lacks an effective alternative way to deter an 
attack by any great powers specifically the U.S. besides its capacity of retaliating to 
aggression. This is China's best solution of maintaining the capability to compete with 
other country's such as the United States.  
China is alive to the debate where a sensational media and politicians can whip up 
emotions through alarmist formulations often resulting in a biased view. Luckily the 
nuclear program has widely been conducted secretly, and the country has been able to 
underplay international attention. However, the lack of transparency has created a view 
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that China would want to attain hegemony in the region. The country lays claims on its 
rights to deny foreigners access to its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) for surveillance or 
scientific research.141 The lack of openness creates suspicion and mistrust. The country 
values secrecy and believes that transparency would erode the survivability of its nuclear 
arsenal. However, this secrecy is not without merit. The country through defense 
scientists has indicated its concerns about technological advancements by its adversaries, 
especially in space and missile defense fields. It fears that enhanced satellite 
reconnaissance may give away the location of its weapons as well as the command and 
control facilities. Further, such capabilities would give an aggressor the ability to track 
and target mobile arms or open the country to a "nuclear blackmail" effectively eroding 
the deterrence aim.142 
The U.S. has accused China of contributing to the proliferation of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (WMD) through the supply of nuclear and missile-related technology 
to Iran and Pakistan.143 As a consequence, various private and government-controlled 
entities in China have been subjected to sanctions for contributing to the proliferation of 
WMD. However, it is committed to the proposal of a worldwide disarmament arguing 
that such an undertaking must start with a commitment from all actors on a no-first-use 
policy. Its argument is that without the risk of aggression from any country, the need to 
maintain nuclear weapons would dissipate. Some authors have questioned the sincerity or 
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otherwise of this commitment. A look at the size, force posture, practice and readiness of 
China's nuclear program compared to other great powers tells that the commitment could 
be sincere. 
Moreover, the country conducts Second Artillery training and planning on the 
assumption that China will be in a position to absorb a first nuclear strike and use its 
stock in retaliation.144 It is important to note that the size of the nuclear force has largely 
been determined by China’s strategy rather than technological or financial constraints. If 
the country had determined that it was in its interest to expand the stockpiles 
aggressively, then it could have done that since the 1980s.145 The country has committed 
to implement a lean and effective nuclear force that aims at enhancing survivability, 
safety, reliability and penetrating ability. The size of the stockpiles matches that of 
retaliatory purposes rather than a counterforce as in the case of the U.S. The effectiveness 
aspect of the comparably smaller arsenal has necessitated modernization focusing on 
quality as opposed to quantity. Also, it has made it necessary to replace older liquid-
fueled missiles with solid-fueled mobile ballistic ones. Besides, it has been essential to 
construct deep underground tunnels which form the missile bases.146  
                          Third Chapter Discussion 
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The main theme in the buildup of nuclear weapons is to serve as a tool for 
deterrence. The aim is to make the costs greater than the benefits for the aggressor. For it 
to be effective, realism assumes that the state that uses it can get into the mind or at least 
the intentions of the aggressor and the ability to hold at risk the things that they value. 
However, according to the assumptions of realism, intentions are difficult to discern and 
are often easy to conceal.147 Secondly, great powers have the awareness that they are 
being watched and will thus not lay bare their motivations or what they value in a bid to 
either mislead their competitors against building sufficient retaliatory capability. On this 
account, the secrecy of China’s nuclear program fits into the realism debate but is 
dependent on the fact that a potential aggressor would decode the stance accurately.  
The conduct of international relations puts to doubt whether some actors can be 
relied upon to take due care of their nuclear arms. It appears the opposition to China's 
program is two-faced. On the one hand is the belief by other great powers that China has 
been modernizing its arsenal and on the other is the sale to as unstable states. The first 
argument is aligned with the arguments under realism’s goal of deterrence. Foreign and 
domestic policy decision-making is difficult to discern or to model.  
With the complicated nature of policy, the deceit involved and lack of 
transparency regarding the capabilities and size of military arsenal there is a possibility 
that mistakes in assessment may be made. These could lead to an affinity for a 
confrontation that could escalate to a nuclear level.148 In the case of China, its choice of a 
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non transparent approach has been exploited to create alarmist narratives regarding the 
size and threat of its nuclear arsenal. There is no empirical evidence to substantiate this 
alleged threat. Unfortunately, at home, these may be interpreted to mean that the world 
system presents a threat to the survivability of the state and may, in fact, justify efforts to 
enhance retaliatory capabilities as explained in realism.  
Realists seem not to factor in the degree of risk and uncertainty of miscalculating 
threats, accidents, misreading of errant information or the intentional use by irrational 
actors. Waltz argued for the increased capability of second strike to promote deterrence 
measures. Deterrence is based on the assumption that competitors will decode the actions 
of a state accurately.149 The possibility of human error or computer failure could trigger 
and escalate to a nuclear war. Realism does not explore this fact. In such a situation, the 
assumption that great powers are rational would not hold as the aggrieved nation could be 
under pressure to retaliate sparking a situation where everyone loses. Such mishaps have 
been witnessed in the U.S. in 1980 where a failure in the computer chip of the NORAD 
Control System resulted in false missile warning displayed random numbers of attacking 
missiles.150 Luckily, the mishap was noticed before any retaliation could be mounted. The 
luck in the past provides no guarantee that such luck will be enjoyed in the future. Similar 
system malfunctions were reported in the Soviet Union in 1983 and 1995, but no action 
was triggered.  What remains intact is that the events do not take away are the retaliatory 
capability of states.  
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Chinese retaliation from an offensive nuclear strike from another country would 
lead to a retaliation directly targeting Chinese homeland. In fact, such a situation 
contradicts with the assumption that national goals supersede international ones. The 
pessimism with which realists justify growth in military capabilities while consistent with 
the fact that nations have to assume the worst case regarding their adversaries may not be 
practical in a world system where war is no longer a strategic tool (I.e, nuclear war).151 
    Third Chapter Conclusion 
The study has explored the hypothesis that China’s nuclear program is a rational 
decision by a state actor aimed at survivability of the nation and which can be explained 
through realism. The findings are that the country's commitment to the NFU of nuclear 
weapons, government policy, size and posture of its arsenal all point to the acceptance of 
this hypothesis as they advance the goal of deterrence by enhancing survivability and 
capability to retaliate any nuclear aggression, to include a rapid buildup of Chinese 
missiles. Also, the realities in the East and the South China Sea have been used to justify 
the nuclear modernization program. Therefore, realism has also shown that it is likely 
that China will be pursuing hegemony in the region.  
 
Thesis Conclusion 
For the United States to determine real policies to counteract the North Korean 
and Chinese nuclear threat, emphasis must be placed on understanding the political 
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nature of both countries. Also, encouraging and strengthening our allies to proceed with 
capability upgrades is a vital mission America must undertake. North Korea has remained 
a threat to the international community by consistently testing their nuclear program, 
ballistic missiles, and threats to neighboring countries such as Japan. Realism explains 
the origins and desire to constantly upgrade the North Korean nuclear program. The 
realism theory underscores that nations are inherently right to serve as ambassadors of 
self-defense. Military and nuclear capability is a primary ingredient to self-defense 
according to North Korean ideology. North Korea desires to maintain their security 
independence and they deeply desire to advanced their nuclear agenda in order to 
increase their security. The DPRK relies on its own perception of power and its relevance 
to upgrading their nuclear power. Realism is connected to the pursuit of power and the 
DPRK uses this reason as to why they are consistently upgrading their nuclear power. 
Thus, realism explains the growth and origins of the North Korean nuclear program. 
South Korea not possessing a nuclear program brings order and balance to an 
unstable region in the Asia Pacific. South Korea not possessing a nuclear program is a 
strength, not a weakness. There lies too much unpredictability to the Asia Pacific region 
if South Korea pursued a nuclear program. In South Korea's situation, power and security 
are core values that are consistently sought after in the quest to counteract North Korea's 
nuclear program. Not only is power defined differently between realists and neorealist, 
power is also the fundamental reason why the United States does not allow South Korea 
to possess a nuclear program. Additionally, cooperation is not well defined under 
neorealism due to selfishness of states. Neorealists are quick to identify that cooperation 
is more likely to work under economic terms vice military situations. Nonstructural 
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factors such as security enhancements and power pursuits are more likely to define the 
American-South Korean relationship, as well as the origins of the South Korean nuclear 
program.  
South Korean's leadership, presently and historically, are much more concerned 
with regional security than mere power projection (which is what realists refer to as 
"power"). This ideology is the foundation of neorealism. Enhancing a nuclear state would 
mean less security and more demands to project power in order to dissuade other 
countries from testing the South Korea's nuclear agenda. Therefore, neorealism explains 
the origins and lack of a nuclear program in South Korea.   
China's nuclear program and connection to realism is similar to the theory of 
structural realism in that great powers fear and mistrust each other's actions in an anarchic 
international structure. It no secret that China fears the growth of the United States' 
economic, military, and political power. Yet, China fully understands that its responsible 
for growing its nuclear power in order to project their power against the United States. 
China does not rely on its alliances with its allies for power pursuit and projection, which 
supports the realist political theory. Just like realism explains, China's ability to hide its 
intentions and conceal their nuclear buildup reasoning underlines the definition of realism 
(and the deceptive piece that is part of the definition). This is typical, since China has 
zero desire to inform anyone in the international community as to why its building up and 
continually testing its nuclear agenda. Realism recognizes the goal of nuclear deterrence 
under the Chinese nuclear agenda. Nonetheless, Chinese strategic nuclear agenda helps 
define the concepts covered under realism, particularly the pursuit of power ideology.  
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Future recommendations will include further study from America to correctly 
identify the reasoning behind the continual development of the North Korean and 
Chinese nuclear programs. It will not be enough to upgrade South Korea's defensive 
systems or place anti-ballistic systems there. The United States must first continue to try 
to understand the foundation of the North Korean and Chinese programs. With that 
knowledge, using realism and neorealism to predict the future behavior of both North 
Korea and China is critical to future American military success against these regimes. If 
America is only aware of the military capabilities of both North Korea and China, that is 
a serious handicap.  
Future areas that are recommended for further research would include other 
political theories to test their relevance to the current situations with regard to nuclear 
buildup in North Korea and China. While realism and neorealism are the best theories to 
explain the nuclear situations in North Korea, South Korea, and China, other schools of 
thought under the international relations theory banner could prove beneficial to complete 
a holistic understanding of the relevant regimes. In other words, it is insufficient to know 
the capabilities and limitations of the North Korean and Chinese nuclear programs. The 
fundamental understanding of why each program exists and why they intend to grow 
under political theories is essential to fully understand each nuclear agenda. Other 
political theories under the International relations theme include liberalism, 
constructivism, and marxism. 
America, above all else, must remain consistent against the North Korean and 
Chinese nuclear threat. It will take much more than relating political theories to their 
rivals' agendas for complete political stability in the Asia Pacific theater. Upgrading the 
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Aegis ships located in Japan, the terminal defense systems in South Korea, and increasing 
military presence along the South Korean coasts are crucial courses of actions that 
America needs to continue to take to show a determined force to stop the North Korean 
and Chinese nuclear threats. Idly sitting by or being indecisive within American 
leadership about the courses of action against those same threats only prolongs the 
inevitable confrontation with both North Korea and China. Strategic patience will still be 
a concept the United States uses against both of the countries. Perhaps if America 
developed a different system besides sanctions or strengthened sanctions against North 
Korea, they would eventually see a denuclearized North Korea and China. Until America 
makes a decision to take a different course of action, we can expect to see the same 
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